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Aristotelian Piety Reconsidered 
Joachim Aufderheide 
King’s College London 
Fellow of the Harvard Center for Hellenic Studies (’16/’17) 
 
Introduction 
Aristotle apparently does not discuss piety in the Nicomachean Ethics. The 
omission is puzzling because piety was an important and well-discussed virtue; 
Plato even devoted a whole dialogue to it, the Euthyphro. I will not dwell long on 
possible explanations. Prima facie, Aristotle could have made room for piety, but 
chose not to: while not an intellectual virtue, piety would fit the triadic scheme of 
character virtue, excess, and deficiency. Alternatively, piety could fall in the 
remit of friendship (philia), if the pious person is loved by (phileisthai) the gods.1 
However, the discussion of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics (EN VIII-IX) does 
not contain a section on piety. The lack of engagement is all the more surprising 
because Aristotle usually registers disagreements with his predecessors quite 
vocally. So, what happened to piety? 
 
While Aristotle does not explicitly put forward piety as a virtue in the EN, Sarah 
Broadie has proposed one passage (henceforth ‘the Passage’) to contain a 
clandestine discussion of piety. Piety, she argues, ‘puts in an appearance and 
receives an implicit definition’.2  
  
The Passage 
And the person active in accordance with intelligence, and taking care of it, 
seems to be in the most excellent condition and most dear to the gods. For if any 
attention is paid to human affairs by the gods, as it is thought, it would also be 
reasonable if they both delight in what is most excellent and closest in kind to 
them (and that would be intelligence) and benefit in return those who love this 
most of all and honour it, because they pay attention to what is dear to the gods, 
and acting correctly and finely. And that all this is true of the wise person most of 
all is not unclear; therefore he is most dear to the gods. And it is likely that the 
very same person is also superlatively happy; so that, in this way too, the wise 
person would be happy most of all. (1179a22-32)3 
                                                 
1 Aristotle mentions gods, together with parents, as examples of unequal 
friendships, VIII 12, 1162a4-6; VIII 14, 1163b16-17; IX 2, 1165a24-27. Bodéüs 
2000:139 proposes that piety can be truly understood only in the context of philia 
(friendship), but subsumes piety under distributive justice. Broadie 2003:58-60 
decisively rejects the latter suggestion. 
2 Broadie 2003:60. 
3 All translations of Aristotle are mine. 
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We can detect a discussion of piety in the Passage against the background of 
identifying the pious person with the person dear to the gods (Plato, Euthyphro 9e-
11b) — in which case the person leading the life of reflection would live most 
piously. This ingenious reading of the Passage aims to solve two problems at once. 
By reading the content of the Passage as a covert discussion of piety, Broadie not 
only finds a place for piety, but she also can make sense of the otherwise disputed 
text. Most scholars do not take the Passage seriously: either it is misplaced, or 
merely an addition by a later editor (but not genuinely Aristotelian).4 Others have 
tried to write off the passage as “merely” dialectical.5 These scholars reject the 
passage because they cannot reconcile it either with the EN or Aristotle’s thought 
at large (more in the next section).  
 
While I find myself much in agreement with Broadie 2003, I nevertheless offer a 
reconsideration of the Passage. The Passage, I shall argue, belongs to a larger 
argument about the relevance of prosperity to happiness (1178b33-1179a32) and 
should be read as part of it. I propose a reading of the superstructure — the life in 
question is not the practical, but the theoretical life — that lets the Passage fall in 
place, without anchoring it via piety. Finally, examining the inner workings of the 
Passage, I argue that we can make good sense of it without recourse to piety. 
Thus, I offer a reading of the Passage in context that does without piety. If my 
reading is correct — a question I leave open for now — the quest for Aristotelian 
piety remains incomplete. 
 
Problems in the background 
The Passage closes the discussion of happiness in X.6-8, completing the 
discussion of happiness started in Book I. In chapter 5 of Book I, Aristotle 
introduces three kinds of life, the life of (vulgar) pleasures, the life of the 
politician, and the life of theoretical thinking as promising candidates for a happy 
life. Although he quickly dismisses the first two and shelves the third one for later 
discussion, he returns to all of them in X.6-8. Aristotle first shows why pleasure 
cannot play the role of highest good (X.6), before he addresses the question of 
which intellectual virtue, practical wisdom (phronêsis) or theoretical wisdom 
(sophia) should stand at the centercentre of the best life (X.7-8). Aristotle 
forcefully argues for the superiority of the theoretical life, concluding that “‘the 
life in accordance with [theoretical] intelligence … will also be superlatively 
happy,”’, whereas “‘the life in accordance with the other virtue”’ will be 
“‘secondarily <sc. happiest>,”’, “‘for the activities in accordance with it are 
                                                 
4 See Gauthier and Jolif 1958, ad loc., for the first, and Stewart 1892, ad loc., 
for the second. 
5 Burnet 1900; Gauthier and Jolif 1958. 
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human”’ (X.7-8.1178a6-10). Aristotle bolsters the ranking of the best lives by 
examining the central activities and the corresponding lives in more detail. One 
argument, at 1178b7-23, pertains especially to our Passage, because it raises two 
problems. Schematically represented, Aristotle argues 
 
1. The gods most of all (malista) are happy. 
2. The gods are alive and active. 
3. The gods do not engage in ethically virtuous actions. 
4. The gods do not engage in productive actions. 
5. Hence: the gods engage in reflection. 
[6’. For all X: if X is happy, then X is happy in virtue of engaging in the 
excellent activity expressing X’s nature.] 
6. Hence: the gods are happy in virtue of their reflecting. 
7. The activity of reflection in which human beings can engage is most nearly 
akin to the activity of reflection in which gods can engage.  
8. Hence: reflection will be productive of superlative happiness. 
 
The argument agrees with the Passage on human nature, but they apparently 
disagree on the gods. The gods are paradigmatically happy,. bBut in virtue of 
what? They have nothing to do with action; their happiness stems entirely from 
reflection. While we, unlike the gods, do not engage exclusively in reflection, we 
can engage in an activity “‘most nearly akin”’ (suggenestatê, 1178b23)) to the 
gods’ activity of reflection. Since the activity is such as renders a life happy — it 
does so for the gods — it will also do so in the human case:6 it is eudaimonikôtatê, 
“‘productive of superlative happiness’.”7 The argument hangs on our similarity to 
the gods. Our intellect is divine (X.7.1177b30-31), and when we use it properly, we 
assimilate to those who are paradigmatically happy and become happy ourselves. 
Thus, Premise 7 and the conclusion spell out the basis for the Passage’s claim that 
the gods delight in the best men: “‘they (<sc. the gods)> both delight in what is 
most excellent and closest in kind to them.”’  
 
Problem 1: the gods do not act 
The argument behind Premise 3 makes crystal clear that gods do not act, 
virtuously or otherwise: “‘but which actions should one attribute to them? Just 
ones? Or would they appear ridiculous, making contracts and returning deposits 
and so on? … And everything pertaining to the actions will appear small and 
unworthy of gods to those who go through all of them.”’ (1178b10-18). By 
                                                 
6 “‘Human”’ here takes on the wider meaning, including our divine intellect, as 
in 1178a8. 
7 The alternative “‘most productive of happiness”’ seems less apt, because the 
argument suggests that there is nothing else that could produce happiness. 
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contrast, the Passage claims “‘the gods benefit [certain people] in return 
(antipoiein)”’ — as if they were exchanging favours with humans. Since gods do not 
act at all, how could they possibly do anything for for human beings? 
 
Problem 2: the gods do not think of human beings 
What do the gods think of when they engage in reflection? Although Aristotle 
does not give a definitive answer in the EN, he nevertheless maintains that 
theoretical reflection deals with the best and most honourable (timiôtaton) things 
in the universe (1141a34-b3), to which human beings emphatically do not belong 
(1141a20-2). Together with Premise 2, Ppremise 5 entails that the gods do nothing 
but reflecting, a corollary borne out a few lines further down in a comparison 
between a divine and a human life: “‘For the whole life of gods is blessed, 
whereas the life of human beings is blessed only insofar as a certain similarity with 
this sort of activity exists: and none of the other animals will be happy since they 
share in no way in reflection’ (1178b25-8). ” If the gods engage in happiness-
producing activity for the whole of their lives and think only of things better than 
human, then they cannot pay attention to human affairs — contrary to the 
Passage.8 
 
Unfortunately, the solutions interpreters have proposed on noticing the 
problems appear jejune: 
a) Does Aristotle perhaps only tentatively put forward the points that lead to 
the problems in the Passage? After all, he uses distancing qualifiers (“‘seems”’, 
“‘is likely”’) and the non-committal optative mode in the Passage. While these 
observations are true of the first part of the Passage, Aristotle shifts tone and very 
firmly endorses the conclusions (“‘and that all this is true…”’) — which means he 
equally firmly endorses the antecedents.  
b) Aristotle’s real work is done: he has shown why the life of theoretical 
thinking is best, according to the principles of Aristotelian philosophy. In the 
Passage, he seeks to convert those who have a popular view of the gods, but lack 
the refined, Aristotelian understanding. The argument is merely ad homines.9 
Writing off the Passage in this way does not sit well with the methodological 
principle Aristotle recalls immediately before the Passage, that true words carry 
the most conviction: “‘one should, examine what was said before by referring to 
the deeds and the life, and when it harmonises with the deeds one should accept 
it, but when it differs assume it to be mere words’ (1179a20-2). ” Aristotle will 
                                                 
8 A different way of raising Problems 1 and 2 begins with Aristotle’s account of 
god in Metaphysics 12.7-9, according to which god engages only in “‘thinking of 
thinking’ (noiêsis noêseôs).” The problem only arises if we can assume that the EN 
presupposes the Metaphysics’ theology — an assumption that lacks support (Bodéüs 
2000: 7-13. Cf. Broadie 2003: 64. 
9 Burnet 1900 and Gauthier and Jolif 1958 ad loc. 
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hardly exhort his audience to look for the congruence between life and words just 
before dissimulating his words to catch a some more lost souls. Such a move would 
surely put off Aristotle’s core audience, those who are brought up well, and share, 
largely, Aristotle’s outlook.10 
 
To sum up, the Passage presents a picture of human beings and human 
happiness consistent with the previous line of argument. It appears, however, to 
suppose a radically new picture of the gods that conflicts with the preceding 
arguments. Since the Passage comes right after the methodological point that 
exhorts us to scrutinizse Aristotle’s words, we must face the question, rather than 
look away: why the Passage? I will answer the question in two steps. In the next 
section I will show why Aristotle needs the Passage in the context where it 
appears, before turning, in the subsequent section, to addressing the two 
problems. 
 
The Passage in context 
The Passage, I propose, should be read as part of the next bigger unit of 
thought. “‘The Unit”’ (1178b33-1179a32), as I shall call it, plays a role comparable 
to chapters 8 and following of Book I. Chapter 7 of Book I completes the 
(preliminary) account of happiness; chapters 8-11 examines how well the account 
chimes with the things said about happiness, both by ordinary people and the wise. 
Similarly, just before the Unit, Aristotle has concluded (again) that “‘happiness 
will be a kind of reflection’ (1178b32),” and then he turns explicitly to the wise at 
1179a8-13 (on Solon) and 1179a13-17 (on Anaxagoras). Unlike Book I, the present 
stretch of argument concentrates on only one or two topics: external prosperity 
(1178b33-1179a17) and, relatedly, god-given good fortune (1179a22-32). Since 
Aristotle has already used the need, or rather absence of need, for external 
resources as a benchmark for ranking theoretical wisdom higher than its practical 
counterpart at 1177a27-b1 and more thoroughly at 1178a23-b7 — why does he go 
over external resources yet again? 
 
How well the Unit is integrated in the flow of the argument of X.7-8 depends on 
what we take the contest between the best lives to be. Consider the beginning of 
the Unit: 
 
And happiness for a human being will also need external prosperity, for our 
nature is not self-sufficient for reflection, but needs also bodily health [b35] and 
food and the other services to be in place. [1179a1] Now, one must really not 
                                                 
10 For more details, see Broadie 2003:61-63 who trenchantly criticises b). This is 
why relocating the Passage, as proposed by Gauthier and Jolif 1958, does not 
improve its standing. 
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think that the person who is happy will need a great many of them, even if it is 
not possible to be blessed without external goods: for what is self-sufficient does 
not depend on excess, nor does action, and also without ruling land and sea one 
can do [a5] the fine things. For one can act in accordance with virtue also from 
moderate means (and one can see this clearly, for private citizens seem to do the 
decent things no less than those in positions of power, but even more), and it 
suffices to have resources to this extent. For the life of the person active in 
accordance with [the] virtue will be happy. (1178b33-1179a9) 
 
Taking the clue from the last sentence, one might think Aristotle has turned to 
the life of ordinary virtue, arguing that it, after all, does not require so many 
resources to count as happy.11 But the Unit begins with the person living a life of 
reflection, the wise person, and then talks about the resources needed for 
practical virtue. If we take the text at face value, Aristotle would attend to the 
possible problems the need for external resources poses to the wise person. Since 
no human thinker is perfectly self-sufficient for reflection, one must be concerned 
with external goods. One can pursue the goods in better and worse ways, and 
Aristotle assumes the supremely happy person pursues them in the best way, i.e. 
in accordance with virtue. Moreover, some virtuous actions themselves require 
external resources: the wise person, “ ‘insofar as he is a human being and lives 
together with many others, chooses to do what is in accordance with virtue’,” for 
which he will need money, power, occasion and the like (1178b5-7). While he 
earlier emphasizsed that the person engaged in thinking (tô(i) theôrounti, 1178b3) 
will not need resources, whereas the person engaged in grand-scale actions will 
need many of them (1178b1-4), Aristotle now addresses the problem of whether 
the requirement to act virtuously will hinder the wise person’s living the happiest 
life. 
 
The problem evaporates, Aristotle informs us, because the wise person need 
not seek to act on a grand scale, requiring a position of power, but rather on a 
private level. Since acting in accordance with ethical virtue does not require many 
resources, it will not endanger happiness: the constraint to act in accordance with 
virtue does not threaten the philosopher’s happiness because the resources 
required for acting well are easy to come by. If the Unit aims not at establishing 
that the practical life can be happy, but rather at establishing that reflective will 
be happy because its practical aspects will not require too many resources, the 
dicta of the wise fall in place — and so does the Passage.  
 
                                                 
11 So Stewart 1892:455. 
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At first glance, the two wise men forward the argument merely by agreeing 
with Aristotle’s main message. At second glance, however, especially “Solon” 
especially leads over to the Passage. 
 
Solon 
And Solon, too, [a10] perhaps represented the happy well, when he said that 
they had been moderately provided with external resources, but had done the 
finest things (in his view), and had lived moderately: for it is possible that those 
who possess only moderate means do what one should. (1179a9-13) 
 
Aristotle alludes to a view we find expressed in the meeting Herodotus 
imagines to have taken place between Solon and the fantastically rich king Croesus 
(Histories I 29-33).12 Instead of flattering Croesus, Solon ranks ranks a certain 
Tellus of Athens first and a pair of brothers (Cleobis and Biton) second in terms of 
happiness. While Aristotle distances himself from the details of Solon’s view — 
unlike Solon, Aristotle thinks the finest actions will be big-scale and hence do 
require immense resources (1177b16-18 ) — he nevertheless supports Aristotle’s 
claim that one can perform fine actions without ruling ‘land and sea’ (1179a4-5, 
quoted above): in order to do what one should (prattein ha dei), one only needs 
moderate means. Those actions  will be part of every happy life, including the 
reflective one, but they do not raise the bar very high for external resources. 
 
Anaxagoras 
And Anaxagoras, too, seems to have assumed the happy person to be neither 
rich nor in a position of power, saying that [a15] he would not be astonished if 
the happy person appeared out of place to the many, for they judge by the 
external resources, as they see only them. The arguments, then, seem to agree 
with the views of the wise. (1179a13-17) 
 
Exhibit number two, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, is the first philosopher to have 
settled in Athens. Anaxagoras supports Aristotle’s view in two ways. First, Aristotle 
picks a sound bite supporting his own stance on external prosperity: you do not 
need riches or political power to be happy, because the political life is not the 
only way to happiness. Second, and more implicitly, Anaxagoras exemplifies 
Aristotle’s ideal of the reflective life. According to Aristotle’s report of 
                                                 
12 Aristotle cites Solon here as one of the seven sages (cf. 1179a17), as opposed 
to statesman or poet. It is not necessary for my purposes to decide which parts of 
Aristotle’s Solon belong to the historic Solon, and which ones belong to Herodotus 
or other figures in the tradition, as Aristotle seems to have Solon-as-presented-in-
Herodotus in view. Cf. EN I.10. For the difficulties of establishing the original 
Solon, see Noussia Fantuzzi 2010:1-17 and Munson 2001:181-196. I thank Stylianos 
Chronopoulos for discussion on this point. 
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Anaxagoras, life is worth living only when one lives “‘for the sake of contemplating 
the heavens and the order of the cosmos’ (Eudemian Ethics I 5, 1216a10-16).” As  a 
resident foreigner (metoikos), Anaxagoras was barred from political participation 
in Athens (just like Aristotle later) — and yet he considered himself happy because 
he did contemplate the heavens and the cosmos. 
 
Even more implicitly, dropping the name “‘Anaxagoras”’ evokes a back-drop for 
the Passage. Anaxagoras’ contemplationsng brought him not only happiness, but 
also made him vulnerable to political scheming aimed at his friend and sponsor 
Pericles.13 Anaxagoras was tried, and found guilty, for impiety or blasphemy 
(asebeia) because he regarded the sun and the moon, traditionally thought to be 
deities, as stones (Plato, Apology 26d-e). One way of reading the Passage, then, 
would be as an exoneration of Anaxagoras, or rather ‘the intellectual activity for 
which he stands’.14 Piety enters the picture if we add the further assumption that 
Aristotle’s “‘loved by the gods”’ stands for “‘pious’,” as it does in Plato’s 
Euthyphro. I do not want to deny that the name “‘Anaxagoras”’ may raise the 
question of impiety and piety, or that those who think of Plato’s take on piety 
detect an implicit definition of piety in the Passage.15 However, I would like to 
explore how we can account for the Passage without that assumption. 
 
Instead of anchoring the Passage on Anaxagoras, I propose to re-examine 
Solon’s contribution to the Unit. At face value, “Solon” supports Aristotle’s view 
that the wise person will not need many resources to live happily. Mentioning 
Solon will no doubt recall the substantive discussion in EN I 10 which examines the 
relationship between a happy and a complete life. In particular, it will recall 
Solon’s characteristic view that we can judge a man happy only at the end of his 
life because of the unforeseeable vagaries of fortune. Putting “Solon” in the 
context of the Unit stresses the cause of our dependence on good fortune: the lack 
of self-sufficiency (1178b33). Like Aristotle, Solon does not attribute self-
sufficiency to human  beingsbrings: “‘no one (who is but man) can have all these 
good things together [sc. being free from deformity, sickness, and all evil, and 
happy in his children and his comeliness, and ending his life well]’ (Histories, I 
32.33-6, tr. Godley).” In particular the last item, “‘making a gracious end of life,”’ 
defies human control: the gods may influence a person’s good fortune and end, 
depending on the person’s attitude. Arrogant Croesus, for instance, will be ruined 
because the divine (to theion) becomes jealous and troublesome (I 32.5-7). The 
two twins, by contrast, receive the best — here: the best death and hence 
                                                 
13 I draw on the authoritative studies Mansfeld 1979 and 1980, which the reader 
should consult for details and especially the dates of Anaxagoras’ life. 
14 Broadie 2003:68. See also Broadie and Rowe 2002:447-449. 
15 Broadie 2003:67-68. 
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immunity from reversal of fortune — because they honoured the goddess so highly 
(I 31.22-3). Thus, mentioning Solon raises the question whether human beings, 
lacking in self-sufficiency, depend for their happiness on the gods’ good will. More 
particularly, Solon suggests only those who are dear to the gods will have lived 
happily, whereas those who offend the gods will meet their fate sooner or later. 
 
Anaxagoras fits into the subtext of the Unit because his good fortunes seem to 
have abandoned him. His trial for blasphemy resulted in exile. Is that not proof 
enough the gods turned their backs on him after he reduced them to stones? No, 
because the gods only would removed him only from the political centerre of the 
Greek world. Having moved to Lampsacus, he was able to continue with his 
studies, receiving due honours from the citizens for his work. Anaxagoras thus 
vividly reminds us of the central role of theoretical thinking for happiness. What 
most people perceive as misfortunes will not be misfortunes to the wise person. He 
can live happily, as long as he has enough to act decently towards other people, 
and, more importantly, to engage in reflection. The Passage, then, takes up the 
questions raised by “Solon” and “Anaxagoras”: a) is there a connection between 
being loved by the gods and happiness? And b) What kind of person is loved by the 
gods?16 
 
The wise person who actively uses his theoretical intelligence is the answer to 
the second question — Aristotle’s main target in the Passage. He curtails the 
answer to the first question — “‘it is likely (eikos) that the person [dear to the 
gods] is also superlatively happy”’ — for two reasons. First, he has said so much 
about the connection between using intelligence and happiness already that we 
need no further argument. By contrast, the answer to b), which also starts with a 
contention of the same status, is new and requires argument. Aristotle must 
explain why it seems or is likely that (eoiken) the thinker is dearest to the gods. 
Second, the EN is not the place to speculate whether the person is happy because 
he is dear to the gods. Aristotle refuses to to investigate whether happiness is a 
gift from the gods in I.9.1099b14, relegating such questions to a different kind of 
enquiry. The Passage, therefore, confines itself to establishing that the wise 
person is both most loved by the gods and happiest. 
 
How the Passage works  
Let us finally turn to the interpretation of the Passage. The two problems with 
the Passage disappear with the proper understanding of the gods’ relation to 
human beings. The first question — How could the gods benefit human beings? — 
                                                 
16 Aristotle pauses over a methodological point (1179a17-22), prompted by the 
adducing the opinions of the wise, before turning to the Passage. I agree entirely 
with the explanation given by Broadie 2003:65-67. 
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can be answered only afteronce we address the second problem, explaining how 
the gods could think of human beings without stopping to think of the best things 
in the universe. 
 
We can see why the gods do not need to debase themselves to think of human 
beings if we take into consideration the anthropology that which furnishes 
Aristotle’s view of the best life. In the Passage, Aristotle writes “‘it would also be 
reasonable if [the gods] both delight in what is most excellent and closest in kind 
to them (and that would be intelligence)”’ — as if the gods cared only about the 
person’s intelligence, but not about the compound human being. Aristotle can 
nevertheless rightly claim in the Passage that “‘the person active in accordance 
with intelligence … seems to be … most dear to the gods”’ because he has 
distinguished divine intelligence as the leading element from the compound human 
being and, tentatively, identified each person with hisone’s authoritative and 
better element (X 7, 1178a2-3). If a human being is intelligentce most of all 
(malista, 1178a7), and the gods delight in intelligence, then the gods do delight in 
the person, insofar as the person is intelligence. Because our intellect is divine and 
belongs to the honourable things (1177b30; 1178a1), and therefore meets the 
criteria for things worthy of divine thought (cf. VI 7, 1141a18-b8), the gods can 
delight in the person without thinking of anything less than the best things in the 
universe.  
 
As interpretation of the Passage, however, the reading requires a difference 
between the gods and human beings, or else the gods’ interest in human affairs 
will turn out to be no interest in human affairs at all. The difference, Aristotle 
suggests, lies in the kind of intelligence at work. The gods delight in “‘what is … 
closest in kind to them”’ — which again invokes the previous discussion of the 
relationship between the human and the divine. At 1178b20-4, Aristotle has argued 
that the gods are happy in virtue of the activity of reflection, and that the human 
activity of reflection is most nearly akin to it (suggenestatê, premise 7 in the 
argument above), emphasizsing both our proximity to the divine and a gap: the 
gods’ intelligence and ours are closely related in kind, but not the same. We have 
already encountered the symptom of the difference: unlike the gods, we cannot 
engage in the activity of reflection all the time. Why? Aristotle at best alludes to 
one reason for the differences: “‘the <sc. virtue> of intelligence is separable’ 
(1178a22) ”— which at least raises the possibility of excellent activity of an 
intellect not tied to a body. If the gods are disunembodied intelligences, then 
human and divine intelligence would be sufficiently different, because Aristotle 
presents the human being, even at its best and most divine, as embodied 
intelligence. Nevertheless, we can be sufficiently elevated so that the gods do not 
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have to think human thoughts when taking an interest in human beings, but will be 
able to think about the best things in the universe only.17 
 
Let us now turn to the other problem with the Passage, that the gods “‘benefit 
in return those who love [intelligence] most of all and honour it, because they pay 
attention to what is dear to the gods, and acting correctly and finely.”’ Taking 
account of human beings only insofar as they are intelligentce will be reflected 
both in the benefits the gods confer, and the reasons for which they confer them. 
a) If my interpretation is correct, and the gods do not think of typically human 
affairs, such as actions, then the reasons stated here (‘because’ renders 
participles with hôs in the Greek) will not be the reasons occurringent to the gods, 
but an explanation for us: a person needs to act finely and correctly and take good 
care to develop her intelligence in the best way if the gods are to take notice of 
her. The gods only take the result into account, the activity of a well-developed 
intellect. b) The benefits they return to a person caring for intelligence will not 
involve any physical activity, as the gods will benefit the person only insofar as 
they benefit intelligence, and the theoretical intelligence at issue here will not 
have anything to do with physical action: it is not about things subject to action 
(and change more generally), nor can physical changes directly make a difference 
to it (because it is separable).  
 
How, then, can the gods benefit human beings? The answer depends on the 
nature of reflection, the activity of intelligence. Unfortunately, Aristotle says only 
very little about it in the EN. If reflecting comprises quite generally abstract 
thinking about unchangeable things so as to include inquiry, then we may 
reasonably attribute a sudden insight that seems to come out of nowhere to a 
divine source. And, as we all know, these insights take the form of a reward 
insofar as they only occur to someone who has thought about the relevant question 
or problem.18 While the gods send these nuggets of insight to deserving thinkers, 
interacting in a way with human beings, they will not need to act in any of the 
ways to which Aristotle objects in X.8.1178b7-17. All the actions unworthy of the 
gods necessarily require a body; sending a flash of insight does not. 
 
While attractive, the solution does not fully account for the properties of 
human reflection. First, Aristotle thinks reflection the most pleasant activity, 
noting that reflecting is more pleasant for those who know than for those who seek 
knowledge (X.7.1177a25-7). If inquiry is seeking knowledge, it should not count as 
                                                 
17 Thus, the Passage goes some way to address the challenge, put succinctly by 
Norman 1969, that Aristotle’s gods are narcissistic and think only of themselves. 
18 Broadie 2003, 64-65, without, however, locating the source of the insight in a 
deity. 
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reflection, but rather as a stage of intellectual activity leading up to reflection. 
Reflection, by contrast, happens only when we need to take no further steps. 
Taking reflection to be something perfect also helps with a second feature: self-
sufficiency. If reflection required some external input — the gods are external to 
us — it could not count as fully self-sufficient. Aristotle, however, stresses the 
superlative self-sufficiency of reflection in contrast to virtuous action (1177a27-
b1). While the person reflecting will still be able to reflect without other human 
beings (1177a32-3), successful reflection would nevertheless depend on something 
external — contrary to the claim that the person engaged in reflection will not 
need such things (cf. 1178b3-4). In the Unit Aristotle does not question the self-
sufficiency of reflection, but only thematizses our lack of self-sufficiency for 
reflection — which raises the question whether the need for material resources 
and power decreases the good person’s chances to lead a happy life. Especially 
mentioning Solon raises the question to what extent happiness depends on good 
fortune and divine favour. If reflection as the activity central to happiness fails to 
be self-sufficient, success in reflection would depend on good fortune or divine 
favour, and would thus be vulnerable to misfortune in a way similar to the 
practical life, a contingency Aristotle seeks to preclude. Understanding reflection 
as perfection, then, fits on the whole better with the tenor of X.7-8 that reflection 
is the best and cannot be improved. 
 
But how could the gods benefit us if reflection is completely self-sufficient? If 
reflection is already perfect, and if we are responsible for developing our 
intellect, then the gods can benefit the thinker only by providing content suitable 
for reflection.19 Remember, Aristotle deems the content of reflection much more 
divine than a mere human being (VI 7, 1141a34-b1). Of course, the objects of 
thought are, in a way, there for everyone to cognizse — but only those those who i) 
cultivate and attend to their intelligence, and ii) act correctly and finely will in 
fact reap the benefit of divine thought. Therefore, only those who engage in i) and 
ii) will be loved and benefited by the gods:  
a) The gods love what is best and most closely related to the them: 
intelligence. Human intelligence, however, is like the gods’ only when it is active 
(1178b22-3). Hence, the gods will love most those who use their intelligence. 
b) The benefit becomes clearer when we consider the Passage from the 
perspective of the Unit, to which it belongs. Stressing the need for external 
resources, the Unit highlights the contingency of a (human) life on external 
resources. The happiness of the best life, Aristotle has argued, will not be 
endangered: the resources needed for virtuous action — necessary, but not central 
                                                 
19 Either the gods are the content, or else whatever is worthy of reflection is 
for the gods’ sake, a relation thatwhich can be spelled out in different terms of 
approximation or imitation. But Aristotle says nothing about this in the EN. 
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to happiness — will be moderate. In the Passage Aristotle turns to the activity 
central to happiness. In contrast to virtuous action, there is no gap between having 
the right thoughts and motivation and attaining the best results. No good fortune 
will be needed to bridge a gap — as if reflection comes automatically with good 
fortune! Thus, the divine care (epimeleia) does not consist in constantly watching 
over us and rewarding or punishing us depending on our actions and attitudes (a 
view implicit in Solon), but rather in setting up a “mechanism” that automatically 
provides benefits to those who engage in reflection. 
 
Conclusion 
I have provided a reading of the Unit that can explain why Aristotle needs to 
discuss the connection between external resources and happiness yet again. The 
dicta of the wise, Solon and Anaxagoras, fit squarely into that project, and Solon 
in particular helps to lead over to the Passage — without special attention to piety. 
The interpretation of the Passage itself also does not hang on piety. I have tried to 
give a sound interpretation of its inner workings in the wake of the chord struck by 
the Solon passage: the possibility of happiness depending on the gods’ attitude 
towards us.  
 
I have reached my goal if I have given a plausible interpretation of the Passage 
thatwhich does not rest on the Euthyphro assumption that the person loved by the 
gods is pious. I do not claim to have shown that my interpretation is preferable to 
Broadie’s, especially since she is able to put to rest the search for Aristotelian 
piety. Instead, I hope to enable the reader to make an informed choice between 
two interpretations of the Passage. Especially Tthose who have independent 
reasons for the lack of a discussion of piety might find my interpretation especially 
salutary. 
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